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THROWING PRECAUTION TO THE WIND:
NEPA AND THE DEEPWATER HORIZON BLOWOUT*
Sandra Zellmer, Joel A. Mintz, and Robert Glicksman


I. INTRODUCTION

On April 20, 2010, BP’s Deepwater Horizon oil platform blew up. Eleven workers were
killed in the explosion. When the platform sank to the bottom of the Gulf of Mexico two
days later, oil erupted out of the riser—a 5,000-foot pipe connecting the platform to the
well on the ocean floor. Efforts to stem the flow failed when a safety device, the
“blowout preventer,” could not be activated. Finally, after a number of attempts to stop
the leak, BP capped the well on July 15. Nearly 5,000,000 barrels of oil were released
over the course of 86 days, making the Deepwater Horizon the largest offshore oil spill in
world history.1
In this paper, we uncover some of the regulatory failures that led to the disaster. We
focus on the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), and describe how the
government’s failure to take NEPA seriously reveals significant flaws in the oil and gas
program as a whole. This paper analyzes the deficiencies of the NEPA process and
suggests areas for reform. We leave the analysis of additional areas warranting
regulatory overhaul to other scholars.2

II. NEPA AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
NEPA was the first environmental statute of the modern era and it remains a cornerstone
of federal environmental law. NEPA requires federal agencies to engage in a careful
analysis of their proposals before their proposed actions, and their effects, take place. It
is the quintessential “look before you leap” requirement, and an elemental expression of
the precautionary principle in U.S. law. It is designed to achieve two principal goals: to
force agencies to factor environmental considerations into their decisionmaking
processes, even if they would otherwise be inclined to ignore the potential adverse
impacts of their decisions, and to disclose their findings to Congress and the public.
NEPA mandates that for every “major federal action significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment” the federal agency proponent prepare a detailed public
statement, known as an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). The EIS must include:

*

This perspective is derived from the Center for Progressive Reform’s White Paper, Regulatory
Blowout: How Regulatory Failures Made the BP Disaster Possible, and How the System Can Be
Fixed (2010), available at http://www.progressivereform.org/bpoilspill.cfm [CPR White Paper].
The authors thank Alyson Flournoy and James Goodwin for their leadership on the White Paper,
and we also thank Holly Doremus and Victor Flatt for their input on the White Paper’s NEPA
section.
 For details, see New York Times articles compiled on-line at
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/o/oil_spills/gulf_of_mexico_2010/in
dex.html (updated Nov. 8, 2010). 
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•

Information on the impact of the proposed action, any reasonably available
alternatives to it, and any significant adverse effects that cannot be avoided if the
action is implemented; and

•

Disclosure of any irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources should
the action be implemented.3

NEPA also established the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) and authorized it to
develop regulations on NEPA compliance.4 In 1978, the CEQ finalized a set of binding
regulations that apply to all federal agencies.5 The regulations also direct each federal
agency to prepare its own specific NEPA procedures consistent with that agency’s
particular mission. The agencies are required to identify and establish criteria for three
categories of actions: 1) actions that are categorically excluded from environmental
review; 2) actions that call for the preparation of an Environmental Assessment (EA),
which is a concise analysis used to determine whether a full EIS is warranted; and 3)
actions that require preparation of an EIS. EAs are followed by either an EIS or a
“Finding of No Significant Impact” that explains why the action will not have a
significant effect on the environment.6

III. THE ROLE OF NEPA IN DEEPWATER DRILLING
Offshore drilling activities, such as the ones that involved the Deepwater Horizon, are
regulated under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), which establishes a
four-stage oil and gas development process.7 The program includes: (1) preparation of a
nationwide five-year development plan; (2) specific lease sales consistent with the fiveyear plan, identifying which areas are open to development and at what pace; (3)
exploration plans; and (4) development and production plans. Each of these steps is a
separate agency action subject to NEPA.8 At each step, the analysis is intended to be
increasingly detailed and focused, honing in on the specific activities and areas at issue.
At the time the activities related to the Deepwater Horizon were going through these
steps, the U.S. Department of the Interior Minerals Management Service (MMS) was in
charge of ensuring that NEPA was properly applied to offshore drilling activities. In
April 2007, MMS released a “programmatic EIS” that purported to analyze the potential
region-wide impacts associated with the 2007-2012 Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas



42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2) (C) (i) - (v).
42 U.S.C. § 4344.
5
43 Fed. Reg. 55979 (1978).
6
40 C.F.R. § 1500.3, 1500.5 (1), 1504 (e), 1504.1 (a), and 1508.13.
7
43 U.S.C. §§ 1334-1351.
8
See Sec’y of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 337 (1984) (describing the four stages for
developing an offshore well, and noting that each requires “separate regulatory review”). 
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Leasing Program.9 Also in April 2007, MMS released a final EIS (the Multi-Sale EIS)
for eleven lease sales in the Gulf of Mexico Central Planning Area, which covered 80
million square miles, including the Deepwater Horizon site. A few months later, in
October 2007, MMS issued an EA for Lease Sale 206 within the Central Planning Area.10
The EA was accompanied by a Finding of No Significant Impact, which concluded that
because any potentially significant impacts associated with Lease Sale 206 had been
addressed in the Multi-Sale EIS, no new or different impacts remained to be considered.
Finally, in April 2009, MMS approved BP’s drilling plan for the Deepwater Horizon
project without any environmental review whatsoever.11 MMS stated that the plan was
categorically excluded from NEPA because the danger of a blowout, and any potential
environmental damage, was minimal or non-existent.12
MMS’s implementation of NEPA fell far short of the statutory goals and requirements by
failing to consider and plan for the worst case scenario, and by improperly relying on
categorical exclusions and tiered analysis of potential environmental effects. Each
regulatory failure, and how it contributed to the Deepwater Horizon disaster, is described
in detail below, along with proposals for reform.
IV. REGULATORY FAILURES AND PROPOSED NEPA REFORMS
Failure to Consider the Worst Case Scenario
Catastrophes happen. Consider the eruption of toxic gases from the Union Carbide plant
in Bhopal, India, and the explosion and radioactive fallout at the Chernobyl nuclear
power plant in Ukraine. For Americans, examples closer to home include the core
meltdown at the Three Mile Island nuclear reactor, the toxic wastes oozing into the
playgrounds and homes of Love Canal, and the levee failures in the wake of Hurricane
Katrina. Even closer to the topic at hand are the 1989 wreck of the Exxon Valdez and the
ensuing plumes of oil that fouled the waters and coasts of Prince William Sound and the
1969 blowout at Union Oil’s Santa Barbara rig that poured oil into the Pacific and along
the California coast. (The latter event helped motivate the passage of NEPA.) The
likelihood of these events happening may have seemed infinitesimally small before the

9

Minerals Mgmt. Serv., U.S. Dept of the Interior, Proposed Final Program: Outer Continental
Shelf
Leasing
Program
(2007),
available
at
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10
Minerals Mgmt. Serv., U.S. Dept of the Interior, Proposed Gulf of Mexico OCS Oil and Gas
Lease Sale 206, Central Planning Area, Environmental Assessment (2007), available at http://
www.gomr.boemre.gov/PDFs/2007/2007-059.pdf.
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Initial Exploration Plan, Mississippi Canyon Block 252, OCS-G 32306 (2009), available at
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/public_lands/energy/dirty_energy_development/oil_
and_gas/gulf_oil_spill/pdfs/Drilliing_plan_2009.pdf.
12
Id. See CEQ Report Regarding the Minerals Management Service’s National Environmental
Policy Act Policies, Practices, and Procedures as They Relate to Outer Continental Shelf Oil and
Gas
Exploration
and
Development
(2010),
available
at
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/.../20100816-ceq-mms-ocs-nepa.pdf (describing NEPA
analyses related to the Deepwater Horizon) [hereinafter CEQ Report].





fact, but happen they did. And the magnitude of resulting harm, particularly on
vulnerable human and ecological communities, was enormous.
Catastrophes count. The public’s perception of risk and willingness to accept risky
activities turn on the understanding of hazard characteristics, including the potential for
disaster, the irreversibility of potential impacts, the threats to future generations, the
voluntariness of exposure, and the overall costs and benefits of the activity in question.13
In each of the events listed above, the identification, disclosure, and assessment of
potential disasters in advance might have caused the public to oppose—and
decisionmakers accountable to the public to reject—the proposed action or at least insist
and ensure that both people and the environment were protected to the greatest extent
possible.
To promote full disclosure of environmental risks by project proponents and meaningful
scrutiny by decisionmakers and the public, the 1978 NEPA regulations issued by the
CEQ required federal agencies to include a worst case analysis (WCA) of potential
catastrophes, along with a discussion of the probability of occurrence, in their EISs.
WCA was not required for every proposed action, but only when information regarding
potential consequences was unknown. The regulation provided:
If (1) the information relevant to adverse impacts is essential to a reasoned
choice among alternatives and is not known and the overall costs of
obtaining it are exorbitant or (2) the information relevant to adverse
impacts is important to the decision and the means to obtain it are not
known (e.g., the means for obtaining it are beyond the state of the art) the
agency shall weigh the need for the action against the risk and severity of
possible adverse impacts were the action to proceed in the face of
uncertainty. If the agency proceeds, it shall include a worst case analysis
and an indication of the probability or improbability of its occurrence.14
According to the CEQ’s guidance on NEPA implementation, the WCA “should also
include a spectrum of events of higher probability but less drastic impact.”15 The CEQ
explained that “one of the federal government's most important obligations is to present
to the fullest extent possible the spectrum of consequences that may result from agency
decisions, and the details of their potential consequences for the human environment.”16
By forcing the agency to consider the risk and severity of possible, yet uncertain,
catastrophic effects, the 1978 regulation provided the decisionmaker with the necessary
tools to evaluate and balance the need for the action against the risks of moving



Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 Science 280, 283-285, April 17, 1987.
43 Fed. Reg. 55,978 (1978) (codified at 40 C.F.R. 1502.22 (1978)).
15
Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ's National Environmental Policy Act
Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 18026, 18032 (March 17, 1981).
16
Id. 
13
14
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forward.17 Rather than jumping blindly into the unknown, industries and agencies alike
had to face the uncertainties related to their proposals, reveal those uncertainties to the
public, and consider scenarios involving low probability but high-impact events that
might occur during the life of a project. Armed with this knowledge, the public could
assess the merits of the project and provide meaningful input to the decisionmaker.
Despite the importance of worst case scenario analysis, the CEQ rescinded the WCA
requirement in 1986 and replaced it with a new, watered-down regulation. The CEQ
defended its change of heart by arguing that the WCA requirement called for mere
conjecture, and was therefore ineffective as a decisionmaking tool. Moreover, the CEQ
posited that including WCA in NEPA analyses was too “sensational” and would mislead
the public with "endless hypothesis and speculation."18 Several members of the Senate
Committee on Environment and Public Works disagreed, and told the CEQ that
rescinding the WCA requirement would weaken NEPA’s informational benefits.19 The
CEQ dismissed these concerns, however, and, when environmental groups challenged its
new regulation, the Supreme Court deferred to the CEQ and upheld the regulation.20
The CEQ had it precisely backwards when it amended the WCA regulation in 1986: it is
the failure to disclose and analyze all potential environmental effects—especially in the
face of uncertainty—that is misleading. Without the benefit of WCA, it is impossible for
the public and the agency to assess the true costs and risks of a project in comparison to
purported project benefits, and it is equally impossible for the agency and the regulated
industry to prepare effectively for disaster through emergency response plans and other
measures. Moreover, the inclusion of a WCA in an EIS can benefit the decisionmaking
process in other ways, by highlighting opportunities for mitigation and by stimulating
ongoing monitoring of potential trouble spots during the life of the project.
In the case of the Deepwater Horizon, the industry and the agency failed to consider the
“devastating sequence of equipment failures” that were clearly foreseeable but thought
unlikely.21 BP's own exploration plan, approved by the MMS in 2009, minimized the
danger of a spill: “it is unlikely that an accidental oil spill release would occur from the
proposed activities.” Although BP acknowledged that, if a spill occurred, it could impact
wetlands and beaches, it dismissed the significance of those potential impacts: “due to the

17

See Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957 (5th Cir.1983) (upholding the 1978 WCA regulation as
applied to permits for a deepwater port and oil distribution system, and requiring the Corps to
prepare a WCA for a massive spill in the Gulf); Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240,
1245-1246 (9th Cir. 1984) (invalidating a WCA that assumed that at some point it would become
clear that no health effect would result from herbicide spraying in view of agency’s admission
that no level of exposure had been proven safe).
18
Final Rule, 51 Fed. Reg. 15,618, 15,620 (1986).
19
Valerie M. Fogleman, Worst Case Analyses: A Continued Requirement under the National
Environmental Policy Act?, 13 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 53, 56 n.16 (1987), citing Letter from Senators
J. Randolph, R. Stafford, D. Durenberger & M. Baucus to A. Alan Hill, Chairman, CEQ (Feb. 2,
1984).
20
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 356 (1989).
21
Jeff Donn, H. Josef Hebert and Mitch Weiss, Emerging Oil Rig Evidence Shows Lack of
Regulation (AP, May 13, 2010).
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distance to shore (48 miles) and the response capabilities that would be implemented, no
significant adverse impacts are expected.”22 A proper WCA would have required BP and
MMS to consider and plan for these exigencies, even if the risk of a significant spill
seemed remote, and would have provided other federal, state, and local governments and
stakeholders with crucial information to facilitate response planning and implementation.
As it turned out, even the watered-down replacement for the WCA requirement was
breached by MMS. The 1986 CEQ regulation requires agencies to analyze "reasonably
foreseeable" consequences, which include "impacts which have catastrophic
consequences, even if their probability of occurrence is low, provided that the analysis of
the impacts is supported by credible scientific evidence, is not based on pure conjecture,
and is within the rule of reason."23 In the BP case, MMS limited its analysis to the
prospect of spills no larger than 4,600 barrels of oil and completely ignored the risk of a
serious spill. Further, in assessing the aggregate risks of drilling in the Gulf over the 40year life of its plan, it contemplated that only 11,000 to 31,000 barrels might be
spilled. In fact, the Deepwater Horizon released hundreds of times more than that—
about five million barrels.24


In August 2010, the CEQ issued a Report on NEPA Policies, Practices, and Procedures
as They Relate to Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Exploration and Development, in
which it recommended that the new Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation,
and Enforcement (BOEM), a successor to MMS, “[e]nsure that NEPA documents
provide decisionmakers with a robust analysis of reasonably foreseeable impacts,
including an analysis of reasonably foreseeable impacts associated with low probability
catastrophic spills for oil and gas activities on the Outer Continental Shelf.”25 This
recommendation, while a marginal improvement over the watered down 1986 CEQ
regulation, does not go far enough.
The CEQ should reinstate the original 1978 WCA regulation in its entirety. Agencies
should be compelled to perform WCA whenever they lack important information
regarding the specific nature and extent of a proposed action’s potential impacts. This
analysis should also include an indication of the probability of the worst case scenario’s
occurrence.
Reinstating the WCA requirement is consistent with the congressional declaration of
national policy articulated in NEPA, which states that agencies have a responsibility to
avoid “unintended” environmental consequences.26 Requiring WCA would also help

22

Steven Mufson and Michael D. Shear, Pressure Grows for Action by BP, Washington Post,
May 1, 2010.
23
40 C.F.R. 1508.27(b)(7). 
24
BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling Commission, Staff Working Paper No.
3, Amount and Fate of the Oil 16 (last updated Nov. 12, 2010), available at Working Paper,
Amount and Fate.For Release.pdf.
25
CEQ Report, supra note , at 4.
26
42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(3).
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fulfill NEPA’s twin goals of full disclosure to the public and fully informed, well
reasoned decisionmaking by the agency.27
Considering the worst case scenario, and airing it to the public, probably would not have
precluded BP’s oil lease or the development of the Deepwater Horizon. Nonetheless,
including a WCA in the NEPA analysis for the Deepwater Horizon would have made the
government and the public aware of the extent of the risk involved in drilling in that
location, and increased pressure to require responsible parties to prepare for this kind of
disaster in advance. Faced with the risk of an oil spill of this magnitude, surely BP and
the government would have found it difficult to justify failing to ensure that the blowout
prevention systems were reliable and that an effective response and containment plan was
in place before the catastrophe occurred. Given that deepwater development is becoming
more pervasive—at present, there are 3,436 active leases, 1,637 approved drilling
applications, and 26 active platforms—requiring WCA for future development activities
is imperative.28
B. Taking Shortcuts Through Improper Tiering and Categorical Exclusions
CEQ regulations authorize agencies to use “categorical exclusions to define categories of
actions which do not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human
environment and which are therefore exempt from requirements to prepare an
environmental impact statement.”29 The exclusion of appropriate categories of actions
from NEPA analysis makes sense. All agencies engage in actions, such as routine, minor
administrative decisions, that legitimately deserve to be exempt from NEPA. Preparation
of an EIS for such actions would be a pointless exercise, given their nonexistent or
benign effects.
Over the years, however, some agencies have abused the use of categorical exclusions by
refusing to prepare EISs, or even EAs, for proposals that clearly would have, or would
create a non-trivial risk of having, significant effects. Due to excessively broad
application of the categorical exclusion process, many agency actions that pose serious
risks are approved and implemented without any consideration of their potential
environmental consequences. Further, the abuse of the categorical exclusion process
allows these actions to proceed without public input because agencies often fail to
provide public notice before granting categorical exclusions.
The BP oil spill illustrates the negative consequences that can result when agencies abuse
categorical exclusions. MMS approved BP’s development and production plan for the
Deepwater Horizon under a categorical exclusion. As a result, MMS did not consider the
specific potential environmental impacts of BP’s plan on the immediately surrounding
environment (Mississippi Canyon block 252). Instead, less than a month after BP
submitted its plan, MMS approved it in a one-page letter. The letter made no mention of

27
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983). 
28
Offshore
Statistics
by
Water
Depth
(Nov.
http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/fastfacts/WaterDepth/WaterDepth.html.
29
40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.4(p), 1500.5(k).
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the environmental risks the plan entailed, noting only that BP should “[e]xercise caution
while drilling due to indications of shallow gas and possible water flow.”30
In essence, MMS justified its categorical exclusion for BP’s drilling plan on the basis that
a NEPA analysis at that stage in the oil development program would have been
duplicative of those conducted earlier. As explained above, MMS had conducted NEPA
analyses at previous stages in the development of BP’s Deepwater Horizon project,
including a programmatic EIS purporting to analyze the potential regional impacts of the
nationwide five-year oil and gas development plan, an EIS covering the Central Planning
Area, and a supplemental EA for Lease Sale 206, of which the Deepwater Horizon
project was a part. That EA concluded that the sale would have no significant
environmental impacts.31
The use of earlier analyses to substitute for more complete environmental evaluation of
subsequent projects or project phases is known as “tiering.”32 Tiering is intended to
avoid duplicative analysis. If an agency has prepared an EIS on a broad program, there
may be no need to repeat the analysis when it later considers individual projects that are
components of the broader program. Tiering is justified, however, only when the
potential effects of individual implementing actions have been fully considered at the
programmatic stage.33 Often, it is impossible to engage in knowledgeable analysis of the
effects of individual projects at the programmatic stage because the location or
circumstances of those projects are not yet known. In such cases, reliance on a
programmatic EIS to justify the exclusion of individual projects from subsequent NEPA
analysis disguises the agency’s failure ever to consider site-specific, project-level effects,
even if they are potentially catastrophic.
The categorical exclusion used to approve BP’s development and production plan
appears in a Department of Interior manual governing the application of NEPA to MMS.
The manual largely endorses the use of tiering by excluding from NEPA analysis many
agency actions that occur later in the OCSLA development program. The range of actions
excluded by the manual is remarkable, from environmentally innocuous actions such as
“approval of Sundry Notices and Reports on Wells” to those with the potential to create
major environmental disruption, including “[a]pproval of an offshore lease or unit
exploration, development/production plan or a Development Operation Coordination


30

MMS
Approval
Letter
(April
6,
2009),
available
at
www.biologicaldiversity.org/.../oil...gas/.../EP_approval.pdf.
31
See supra notes 9-12.
32
40 C.F.R. § 1508.28.
33
See Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 387 F.3d 989, 997 (9th Cir.
2004) (finding tiered analyses flawed due to failure to include specific information on cumulative
effects).
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Document in the central or western Gulf of Mexico.”34 The latter exclusion covered BP’s
plan.35
Even a cursory look at MMS’s invocation of the categorical exclusion for the Deepwater
Horizon plan shows that the tiering of NEPA analyses is inappropriate in the context of
approving drilling plans. MMS used the exclusion, coupled with tiering, to sweep under
the rug the potential risks of drilling a deepwater well in that location.
The previous EISs and EA were flawed because they relied on unrealistically optimistic
assumptions about the likelihood of an oil spill and the industry’s capability to contain
one if it occurred. The programmatic EIS analyzed the possibility of only one spill of
about 4,600 barrels of oil and other smaller spills, and MMS assumed that between
11,000 and 31,000 barrels might be spilled into the Gulf for the entire 40-year duration of
the Gulf oil and gas development program. Equally damning, BP’s 2009 regional spill
plan is riddled with meaningless boilerplate instead of careful analysis. For example, it
lists walruses, sea lions, and seals as "sensitive biological resources" in the Gulf.36 It is
true that the blowout did not, in fact, affect any of these creatures, because none of them
resides anywhere near the Gulf. The language must have been lifted from Arctic or
Pacific plans. Somehow no one in charge noticed the discrepancy or drew the obvious
conclusion that the inapposite references were indicative of a poorly performed cut-andpaste job, rather than the careful, site-specific environmental analysis that NEPA
demands. In and of itself, this was a fatal defect in the analysis.37 Professor Oliver
Houck’s metaphor vividly describes the problem:


[T]he environmental reviews that accompanied these decisions resembled a stack
of babushka dolls, each couching a smaller one, each painted identically and
saying the same misleading thing. In the dance that followed . . . something ironic
and ultimately deadly happened: the NEPA process not only failed its mission to
enlighten critical OCS decisions, it obfuscated and in the end undercut them.38
The whitewashing of the prospect of a significant spill, and its effects on the Gulf
ecosystem, makes the agency’s reliance on a categorical exclusion for BP’s plan
impossible to justify. MMS asserted that BP’s plan was categorically excluded because

34
516 DM 15.4(C)(10).
35

This categorical exclusion is a slight modification of an exclusion adopted by the U.S.
Geological Survey (USGS) when it supervised offshore drilling. USGS provided no explanation
as to why these actions should be categorically excluded. 46 Fed. Reg. 7485 (1981).
36
Andrew Clark, BP Contingency Plan for Dealing With Oil Spill Was Riddled With Errors, The
Guardian, June 9, 2010, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/jun/09/bp-oil-spillcontingency-plan/print.
BP’s
Plan
can
be
found
on-line
at
http://www.boemre.gov/deepwaterreadingroom/SelectRequest.aspx. 
37
See NRDC v. Hodel, 865 F.2d 288, 299 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (remanding the Department of
Interior’s EIS for the outer continental shelf leasing program in the Pacific and Alaskan regions
for failure to assess the cumulative impact of development on migratory species, and holding that
perfunctory boilerplate style references do not constitute adequate analysis under NEPA).
38
Oliver A. Houck, Worst Case and the Deepwater Horizon Blowout: There Ought to be a Law,
40 Env. L. R. 11033, 11037 (2010).
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the danger of an oil blowout, and any resulting environmental damage, was minimal or
non-existent. The agency simply accepted at face value, without any independent
evaluation or verification, BP’s dubious assertions that:
• Site specific environmental conditions have been taken into account for the
proposed activities and no impacts are expected as a result of these conditions;
• Due to the distance to shore (48 miles) and response capabilities, no significant
effects on wetlands are expected;
• Any unanticipated blowout resulting in a spill is unlikely to have an impact based
on industry wide standards for using proven equipment and response
technologies; and
• In the event of a spill, only “sub-lethal” effects on fish and marine mammals
would occur.39
Remarkably, the drilling plan admitted that “[n]o alternatives to the proposed activities
were considered to reduce environmental impacts,” and that “[n]o agencies or persons
were consulted regarding potential impacts associated with the proposed activities.”40
If ever a project was unsuitable for categorical exclusion, this was it. Indeed, MMS’s
own manual explicitly precludes the use of exclusions in “areas of relatively untested
deep water, or remote areas; or . . . areas of high biological sensitivity; or . . . utilizing
new or unusual technology.”41
MMS at least owed some explanation of why the manual’s bar on categorical exclusions
for offshore oil and gas projects in “relatively untested deep water,” “areas of high
biological sensitivity,” or “utilizing new or untested technology” did not preclude the
issuance of a categorical exclusion for the Deepwater Horizon. Similarly, both CEQ and
Interior Department regulations preclude a categorical exclusion if “extraordinary
circumstances” exist. These include actions with significant impacts on public health or
safety, significant impacts on natural resources such as wetlands, highly uncertain and
potentially significant environmental effects or unique or unknown environmental risks, a
direct relationship to other actions with individually insignificant but cumulatively
significant environmental effects, or significant impacts on endangered or threatened


39

Initial Exploration Plan, Mississippi Canyon Block 252, OCS-G 32306 (Mar. 10, 2009),
available
at
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/public_lands/energy/dirty_energy_development/oil_
and_gas/gulf_oil_spill/pdfs/Drilliing_plan_2009.pdf.
!Id.¶¶ 14.5, 14.7.
41
516 DM 15.4(C)(10).





species.42 A drilling project such as the Deepwater Horizon raised serious questions in
each of those areas.
Since the blowout, the government has begun exploring possible changes in the use of
categorical exclusions for oil and gas development.43 The CEQ Report on NEPA Policies,
Practices, and Procedures as They Relate to Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas
Exploration and Development recommends that BOEM “[r]eview the use of categorical
exclusions for Outer Continental Shelf oil and gas exploration and development in light
of the increasing levels of complexity and risk—and the consequent potential
environmental impacts—associated with deepwater drilling [and] [d]etermine whether to
revise these categorical exclusions.”44
Several months after the capping of the Deepwater Horizon well, the CEQ issued new,
generally applicable guidance on categorical exclusions.45 According to the CEQ, the
expanded use of categorical exclusions “has underscored the need for . . . guidance”
about their promulgation and use. Categorical exclusions are no longer the rare exception
to the need for NEPA compliance, but “the most frequently employed method of
complying with NEPA.”46 Significantly, the guidance recognizes that “[i]f used
inappropriately, categorical exclusions can thwart NEPA’s environmental stewardship
goals, by compromising the quality and transparency of agency environmental review,”
and “the opportunity for meaningful public participation and review.”47
The CEQ’s guidance includes worthy changes that confine categorical exclusions to the
narrow circumstances for which they were envisioned—proposed actions that have no
prospect of creating significant environmental effects and for which environmental
assessment would provide no useful information. The guidance provides that agencies
considering a new exclusion gather and evaluate information and issue findings to
support any conclusion that the excluded activities will not result, individually or
cumulatively, in significant environmental effects. Agencies must similarly document
the application of existing categorical exclusions, and provide supporting analysis for
why the exclusion is not barred by extraordinary circumstances. The guidance also
provides that agencies should periodically review existing exclusions to ensure that the
predictions of minimal environmental effects on which they were based have turned out
to be accurate, that circumstances have not changed so as to demand revocation of or
limitations on those exclusions, and that unanticipated extraordinary circumstances have
not occurred in connection with excluded projects. All of these revisions should help
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avoid egregious applications of categorical exclusions such as the one MMS approved for
the Deepwater Horizon. Indeed, the guidance specifically uses MMS’s application of
categorical exclusions to deepwater drilling as an example of when evolving conditions,
the discovery of new risks, and the use of new technologies undercut the justification for
pre-existing categorical exclusions.48
The guidance, however, does not go far enough to ensure public involvement in agency
resort to categorical exclusions. Although the CEQ has “strongly encourage[d] public
involvement in the establishment and revision of categorical exclusions,”49 it has done
less to assure such involvement in the application of categorical exclusions. The CEQ
instead emphasized the need for agency flexibility in determining the appropriate level of
public engagement. Indeed, the guidance acknowledges that “[m]ost federal agencies do
not routinely notify the public when they use a categorical exclusion,” and notes that
“[t]here are some circumstances” in which “the public may be able to provide the agency
with valuable information, such as whether a proposal involves extraordinary
circumstances or potentially significant cumulative impacts that can help the agency
decide whether to apply a categorical exclusion.”50 Public engagement should be the
norm, not the exception. The default position should require agencies to notify and seek
input from the public on the application of a categorical exclusion, with the agency
bearing the burden of justifying a failure to do so. In any event, BOEM should exercise
the discretion afforded it by the guidance to make public notification and comment
solicitation a routine part of the application of any categorical exclusions to offshore
drilling activities.
The CEQ guidance also addresses the value in seeking input by agencies that are
proposing a categorical exclusion from other agencies with relevant expertise. The
preamble to the guidance provides that agencies “should consider information and
records from . . . other agencies that have experience with the actions covered in a
proposed categorical exclusion.”51 Again, however, this recommendation is not binding,
and the action agency retains the right to determine whether and what kind of interagency consultation it is willing to engage in. We think this recommendation does not go
far enough. Absent a compelling justification to the contrary, the Department of Interior,
before it uses a categorical exclusion for an offshore drilling activity, should solicit the
views of agencies with expertise on the aquatic environment, such as the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency..
Further, we endorse the creation of a presumption that opposition to a categorical
exclusion by an expert agency would prohibit its issuance. The presumption would shift
the burden to the proposing agency to demonstrate that the project would not,
individually or cumulatively, have significant effects and that no extraordinary
circumstances exist that make use of an exclusion inappropriate.
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If MMS had done a better job at the NEPA analyses, and if it had actually analyzed the
drilling plan instead of categorically excluding it from analysis, would it have made a
difference? It is reasonable to think the answer is yes. MMS is authorized to allow the
exploration stage to proceed only if it finds that the lessees' plan “will not be unduly
harmful to aquatic life in the area, result in pollution, create hazardous or unsafe
conditions, unreasonably interfere with other uses of the area, or disturb any site,
structure, or object of historical or archeological significance.”52 Subsequently, at the
development and production stage, MMS is expected to review an additional, detailed
site-specific plan. If MMS finds that the plan would “probably cause serious harm or
damage to life (including fish and other aquatic life), . . . [or] to the marine, coastal or
human environments,” the plan shall be disapproved and the lease may be terminated.53 If
BP and MMS had taken a hard look at the potential for harm to humans, aquatic life, and
the surrounding environment, the Deepwater Horizon plan might not have been
approved.
C. Agency Capture and NEPA
The “captive agency” theory—first enunciated in 1955 by Professor Marver Bernstein—
postulates that federal agencies have a tendency to move so far in the direction of
accommodating the interests of the entities they are charged with regulating that
ultimately those agencies may fairly be seen as a “captive” of the regulated entities.54 The
theory views regulators as subject to unique pressures and influences which invariably
push their actions and policies in a direction favored by regulated firms and away from
the public’s best interests. Among other things, the theory posits that captive agencies
tend to be unduly passive, ponderous, and inefficient, failing to enforce regulatory
requirements with needed vigor and enthusiasm.
The MMS’s inattentive—if not disdainful—implementation of NEPA, in the context of
its hasty approval of BP’s plans for the Deepwater Horizon, supports this theory. MMS
freely accepted BP’s pat assurances that the environmental risks were either minimal or
non-existent. One can safely assume that this uncritical acceptance of BP’s assessment
had something to do with MMS’s desire to promote the expansion of oil and gas
development in the Gulf. As a result, MMS’s failure to take NEPA seriously flouted the
statute’s directive that the potential consequences of federal actions—including the
granting of federal leases, licenses, and permits for private activities—be analyzed and
weighed by responsible, unbiased officials.
Since the Deepwater Horizon blowout, the executive branch has taken steps to address
agency capture within the Department of Interior by creating BOEM and dividing up
some of the duties formerly held by MMS.55 Previously, MMS had three different jobs:
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it was a “cheerleader” charged with promoting the development of offshore oil drilling; it
was a revenue collector; and it oversaw the safety of drilling operations. Testimony
before a 2010 Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the vagaries of agency capture
concluded that, “[a]gainst this conflict-ridden backdrop, it is unsurprising that the agency
gave short shrift to its safety mission.”56 The implementation of mechanisms, or
“metrics,” that keep the focus on an agency's core statutory mission and ensure consistent
oversight by an independent watchdog could help prevent capture and the kind of
regulatory failures that happened here.57 In addition, reforming the NEPA process to
ensure that worst case scenarios are disclosed and analyzed and to preclude the
improvident use of categorical exclusions and tiering is an additional step that must be
taken to mitigate the pressure placed on the regulatory agency.
V. CONCLUSION
The Deepwater Horizon tragedy highlights the need for significant legal reforms. In the
aftermath of the blowout, BOEM has begun to develop another EIS to supplement the
NEPA analyses for the Central and Western Planning Area Lease Sales in the 2007-2012
OCS Program. It pledges to consider new circumstances and information arising from
the blowout. According to BOEM, the supplemental analysis “will focus on updating the
baseline conditions and potential environmental effects of oil and natural gas leasing,
exploration, development, and production” in the Gulf.58 BOEM should take full
advantage of this opportunity to remedy the shortcomings of MMS’s past practices, and
assess fully the worst case scenarios of leasing activities, the potential direct and indirect
effects of catastrophic oil spills on human and ecological communities, and the
cumulative effects of ongoing and new activities in the Gulf. Moreover, the CEQ should
require agencies such as BOEM to perform worst case analyses and to open themselves
to more regular and robust criticism by government agencies and other stakeholders
interested in a proposed project—other than the agency with primary responsibility for
that project—so that all potential risks of harm will be identified and analyzed in a
rigorous, accurate, and unbiased manner.
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